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We study the role of unbiased migration in cooperation in the framework of the spatial evolutionary game on a variety of spatial 
structures, namely a regular lattice, continuous plane and complex networks. A striking finding is that migration plays a universal 
role in cooperation, regardless of the spatial structure. For a high degree of migration, cooperators cannot survive owing to their 
failure to form cooperator clusters that resist attacks by defectors. Meanwhile, for a low degree of migration, cooperation is con-
siderably enhanced relative to that in the static spatial game, which is due to the strengthening of the boundaries of cooperator 
clusters by the occasional accumulation of cooperators along the boundaries. The cooperator cluster thus becomes more robust 
than that in the static game and defectors near the boundary can be assimilated by cooperators. The cooperator cluster thus ex-
pands, which facilitates cooperation. The general role of migration will be substantiated by sufficient simulations relating to heu-
ristic explanations. 
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Cooperation is fundamental to biological and social systems. 
Understanding factors that facilitate and hamper coopera-
tion is a significant issue. In the framework of evolutionary 
games, a number of mechanisms in favor of cooperation 
have been found, such as costly punishment [1,2], reputa-
tion [3,4] and social diversity [5–7]. Quite recently, the role 
of migration in cooperative behavior has drawn growing 
interest [8–14] because of the fact that migration is a com-
mon feature in nature and society [15–17]. For example, 
millions of animals migrate in the savannas of Africa every 
year, and thousands of people travel among countries every 
day. In this regard, Vainstein et al. [10] considered a sce-
nario that individuals can move to neighboring sites on a 
two-dimensional lattice randomly with some probability. In 
particular, it was found that such movement can maintain 
and even enhance cooperation. More recently, Meloni et al. 
[13] studied the evolutionary games involving mobile play-
ers on a continuous plane. Their results showed that cooper-
ation can survive provided that both the temptation to defect 
and the velocity at which individuals move are not too high. 
Beyond random migration, Helbing and Yu [11] proposed a 
success-driven migration strategy that is spurred by the 
pursuit of profit as a nature of individuals. Specifically, in-
dividuals tend to move to neighboring sites with the highest 
estimated payoffs. Interestingly, such migration results in an 
outbreak of cooperation in a noisy environment. Recently, 
Yang et al. [14] proposed an aspiration-induced migration 
in which individuals migrate to new sites provided that their 
payoffs are below some aspiration level. It is found that a 
moderate aspiration level best favors cooperative behavior. 
Although it has been demonstrated that migration can 
promote cooperation in evolutionary games on some regular 
spatial structures [10–12], the role of migration on other 
kinds of structures, for instance, complex networks, is un-
known. A natural concern is then whether migration plays a 
general role in cooperation, regardless of the underlying 
structures, or the role of migration is dependent on the 
structures. To address this issue, this paper incorporates 
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random migration in evolutionary games on a variety of 
spatial structures, involving continuous space, regular 
structure, and typical complex topologies. Strikingly, we 
find that the role of random migration in promoting cooper-
ation is universal, regardless of structures. This is somewhat 
counterintuitive in the sense that the mobility of individuals 
may weaken the stability of cooperation clusters, which is 
key for the survival of cooperators. However, we will sub-
stantiate the positive effect of random migration on cooper-
ation with intensive simulations and provide convincing 
explanations of the underlying mechanisms.  
1  Model  
To be concrete, we use the Prisoner’s Dilemma [18] in our 
research. In principle, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game 
played by two players, each of whom chooses one of two 
strategies, cooperation or defection. They both receive pay-
off R upon mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. 
If one defects while the other cooperates, the cooperator 
receives S while the defector gets T. The ranking of the four 
payoff values is T > R > P > S. Thus, in a single round of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is best to defect regardless of the 
opponent’s decision. The Prisoner’s Dilemma has attracted 
much attention in theoretical and experimental studies of 
cooperative behavior. Following common practice [16], we 
set T = b (1 < b < 2), R = 1, and P = S = 0, where b repre-
sents the temptation to defect. 
To explore the role of migration, we resort to the spatial 
game in which individuals are placed on spatial structures. 
Since the introduction of spatial structures into evolutionary 
games by Nowak and May [19], there has been much inter-
est in revealing the effects of population structures on co-
operation, ranging from regular lattices to complex net-
works. In spatial games, interactions among individuals are 
restricted to immediate neighbors and usually neighbors of 
an arbitrary individual remain fixed. Meanwhile, in the 
presence of migration, neighboring individuals can be 
changed by encountering different partners as time goes on. 
In the seminal works of Vainstein et al. [10] and Meloni et 
al. [13], random migration was considered in spatial games 
on a two-dimensional lattice and on a continuous plane, 
respectively. Inspired by this original research, we extend 
migration on a regular structure to complex networks and 
uncover the general role of migration in promoting and 
hampering cooperation. 
2  Simulation results 
Let us first consider individuals moving on a continuous 
square plane with periodic boundary conditions. Initially, 
individuals are randomly located on a square plane and co-
operators and defectors with equal percentage are randomly 
distributed on the plane. At each time step, each individual 
plays the game with individuals falling within a circle of 
radius q centered at his/her current position. Individuals 
synchronously update their strategies according to a 
best-takes-over reproduction; that is, each individual com-
pares his/her payoff with that of his/her neighbors and up-
dates his/her strategy by following the one (including him-
self/herself) with the greatest payoff. After the strategy up-
dating process, individuals move to new locations with 
random directions of motion at migration speed v. The ab-
solute value of v is the distance an individual can move in a 
typical time step. Figure 1(a) shows the fraction of cooper-
ators as a function of the temptation to defect for different 
values of migration speed v. We see that compared with the 
static case (v = 0), cooperation is enhanced in a wide range 
of temptation to defect when individuals move slowly (v = 
0.04). On the other hand, fast motion (v = 1) leads to com-
plete extinction of cooperators, analogous to the situation 
arising in the well-mixed population. 
 
 
Figure 1  Fraction of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect b. (a) Individuals are located on a continuous square plane (SP) of linear size L = 
20 with periodic boundary conditions. Interaction radius q = 1. Filled squares, open circles and open triangles show results for v = 0, v = 0.04 and v = 1, 
respectively. Lines are visual guides. (b)–(e) Individuals are located on square lattices (SL), random graphs (RG), small-world networks (SW) and scale-free 
networks (SF). Average connectivity z = 4 for SL and SF, z = 6 for RG and SW. Filled squares, open circles and open triangles show results for p = 0, p = 
0.001 and p = 1, respectively. The population size is 1024. The equilibrium fraction of cooperators is obtained by averaging over 105 time steps after a tran-
sient period of 105 time steps. Each data point depicted corresponds to an average of more than 1000 simulations; that is, 100 runs for 10 different realiza-
tions of the same class of graph. 
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Next, we study individuals migrating on various network 
models, including square lattices (SL), random graphs (RG) 
[20], small-world networks (SW) [21] and scale-free net-
works (SF) [22]. Initially, each node of the network is oc-
cupied by an individual, and individuals with two strategies 
(cooperators or defectors) are randomly distributed. At each 
time step, each individual plays the game with individuals 
sitting on the same node and neighboring nodes. Individuals 
synchronously update their strategies according to 
best-takes-over reproduction and then each individual jumps 
to a randomly chosen neighboring node with probability p 
(a node can be occupied by more than one individual). Re-
sults are shown in Figure 1(b)–(e). As compared with the 
static case (p = 0), low migration probabilities (p = 0.001) 
promote cooperation in a wide range of the temptation to 
defect b (except for large b on square lattices and random 
graphs, where the fraction of cooperators is lower than that 
for p = 0), similar to the results for the continuous plane. 
Meanwhile, for high migration probability (p = 1), defectors 
dominate the whole population. 
From Figure 1, we find by comparison with the spatial 
game in the absence of migration, that low migration 
speeds/probabilities can considerably promote cooperation 
whereas high migration speed/probability facilitates defec-
tion, which regardless of underlying structures in a qualita-
tive sense. We also investigated the dependence of the frac-
tion of cooperators on the migration speed v and probability 
p by fixing the value of temptation to defect b. As exhibited 
in Figure 2, as v and p increase, the fraction of cooperation 
monotonously decreases. It is known that in spatial games, 
cooperators can survive by forming clusters [23,24], for 
which the benefits of mutual cooperation can outweigh 
losses against defectors, thus maintaining cooperation. 
Combining Figures 1 and 2, we find that the effect of mi-
gration on cooperation is twofold. For high migration 
speed/probability, cooperation is inhibited since cooperator 
clusters hardly form with the frequent change of neighbors. 
Without the protection of cluster structures, a cooperator 
can hardly survive. For a low degree of migration, it is not 
easy to determine the effect of migration on cooperation. A 
heuristic explanation is that after the construction of coop-
erator clusters, a small perturbation along the boundary due 
to migration can trigger the expansion of cooperator clusters 
and enhance the fraction of cooperation.  
To intuitively understand the effect of perturbation 
around the cooperator cluster on cooperation, we construct a 
crossed cooperator cluster (comprising five cooperators) 
surrounded by defectors on a square lattice (Figure 3). The 
temptation to defect b = 1.4. If individuals are immobile, the 
crossed cooperator cluster is stable and remains unchanged. 
In the presence of migration, situations arising at the cluster 
boundary can be classified into four types: (1) a cooperator 
at the boundary enters the defector cluster, (2) a defector at 
the boundary intrudes into the cooperator cluster, (3) a de-
fector moves away from the boundary within its defector  
 
Figure 2  Fraction of cooperators as a function of the migration speed v or 
the migration probability p. (a) Individuals migrate on a square plane (SP) 
of linear size L = 20. The temptation to defect b = 1.35 and the interaction 
radius q = 1. (b) Individuals migrate on various networks. The temptation 
to defect b = 1.5. Average connectivity z = 4 for SL and SF, z = 6 for RG 
and SW. The population size is 1024. Each data point depicted corresponds 
to an average of more than 1000 simulations; that is, 100 runs for 10 dif-
ferent realizations of the same class of graph. 
 
Figure 3  Red balls represent defectors and blue balls denote cooperators. 
Each individual plays the game with individuals who are located on the 
same lattice and the neighboring lattices. The temptation to defect b = 1.4. 
As a cooperator moves from the cluster boundary into the core of a coop-
erator cluster, the cooperator cluster expands. 
cluster; and (4) a cooperator moves away from the boundary 
within its cooperator cluster. In case (1), the irruptive coop-
erator changes to a defector; in case (2), the irruptive defec-
tor changes to a cooperator; in case (3), nothing happens. 
Cases (1) to (3) do not drastically affect the fraction of co-
operators in the system (data not shown here). However, in 
case (4), the territory of the cooperator cluster expands to 
other regions of the square lattice and the number of coop-
erators increases from 5 to 12, as shown in Figure 3. It is 
thus the arising of case (4) that promotes the prevalence of 
cooperation in the population. In general, this scenario is 
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representative of the strengthening of the cooperator cluster 
boundary by multiple cooperators at the same node (i.e. the 
density of cooperators is augmented along the boundary). A 
direct result is that the payoffs for cooperators along the 
boundary increase and defectors near the boundary are as-
similated. As a result, cooperator clusters expand and coop-
eration is enhanced. 
To visually observe how a low degree of migration af-
fects the evolution of cooperator clusters and defector clus-
ters, we initially set cooperators in the middle region of a 
square plane, while defectors are located in other regions. 
Figure 4(a)–(c) show that, for low migration speed, the co-
operator cluster gradually expands as time step t increases 
and cooperators dominate the whole population in the end. 
For the static case in which individuals do not move, the 
cooperator cluster remains almost unchanged (Figure 4(d)). 
3  Discussion and conclusion 
In summary, we have studied the role of migration in coop-
eration in the framework of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game on a variety of spatial structures. Our finding is that 
although a high degree of migration results in the extinction 
of cooperation, a low degree of migration considerably en-
hances cooperation by increasing the cooperator density 
along the boundary of the cooperator clusters. Owing to the 
accumulation of cooperators along the boundary, the bene-
fits of mutual cooperation outweigh losses against defectors 
near the boundary; this thus not only allows cooperation 
within the cluster to be maintained, but also induces the 
expansion of the cooperator cluster, in contrast to the case 
for the static spatial game. The strengthening at the bound-
ary of cooperator clusters induced by the small degree of 
migration plays a key role in the enhancement of coopera-
tion, regardless of the underlying structure on which the 
evolutionary game takes place. 
 
 
Figure 4  Snapshots of distributions of cooperators (blue) and defectors 
(red) on a square plane of linear size L = 20. Initially, we set individuals 
located in the middle region of the plane as cooperators (the cooperative 
region is a 10  10 square), while defectors are located in other regions. 
The population size is 500, the interaction radius q = 1 and the temptation 
to defect b = 1.5. (a)–(c) Snapshots at different time steps t for v = 0.1. (a) t 
= 0, (b) t = 263 and (c) t = 1315. (d) The snapshot for v = 0 when the sys-
tem reaches equilibrium.  
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